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Liability (and) Rules for Health 
Information 
Jorge L. Contreras† & Francisca Nordfalk†† 
Abstract 
The recent trend toward propertization of health data could pose 
significant challenges to biomedical research and public health. 
Property rule systems can result in sizable up-front costs in the 
acquisition of consent from individual data subjects, as well as the 
ongoing risk that data subjects will retract consent or object to 
unanticipated data uses, thus compromising existing data resources and 
analyses. Instead, we propose that research using individual health data 
should be subject to a regulatory regime, enforceable by 
government/public repositories, while at the same time permitting 
private enforcement actions to address particularized individual injury. 
Thus, while the physical collection of human tissue would continue to 
be subject to existing rules regarding informed consent, ex ante consent 
would not be required for the use of information derived from physical 
samples. Rather, rules regarding permissible research use and handling 
of health information would be put in place, and violations of those 
rules would be dealt with on an ex post basis, both through regulatory 
penalties and private liability actions. These recommendations are 
supported by two cases studies: the Utah Population Database and 
Statistics Denmark, both of which provide examples of successful health 
data repositories that are governed by regulatory systems. While these 
examples are drawn from governmental data resources, the approach 
that they exemplify can be extended to academic and other research 
environments. These case studies suggest that regulatory and liability 
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models should be considered more broadly for the governance of 
research using human health data in lieu of property-based systems. 
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Introduction 
In the wake of recent scandals involving the use and abuse of 
individual data by commercial entities,1 a number of new proposals 
 
1. See generally Taylor Amerding, The 17 Biggest Data Breaches of the 21st 
Century, CSO (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.csoonline.com/article/ 
2130877/data-breach/the-biggest-data-breaches-of-the-21st-century.html; 
Alexis C. Madrigal, What We Know About Facebook’s Latest Data 
Scandal, THE ATLANTIC (Jun. 4, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/ 
technology/archive/2018/06/what-we-know-about-facebooks-latest-data-
scandal/561992/; Jennifer Dudley-Nicholson, Social Media Data Scandal: 
It’s Not Just Facebook, FRASER COAST CHRON. (May 1, 2018), 
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have emerged to recognize personal property interests in individual 
health data. These proposals have largely been made by aspiring data 
intermediaries that would employ technologies such as Blockchain2 to 
enable consumers to control the flow of their personal health data. The 
intermediaries would then act as the consumers’ representative in 
selling that data to healthcare providers, pharmaceutical 
manufacturers, and anyone else interested in it, remitting a portion of 
the revenue back to the consumer.3 The linchpin of this attractive new 
business model is establishing individual ownership of personal data. 
Without ownership, companies, hospitals, insurers, and data 
intermediaries can (and today do) aggregate and sell individual health 
information without consulting, or paying, the individual.4 But if 
consumers owned their data, then anyone that tried to use or sell it 
without permission would be stealing (or at least liable for the tort of 
conversion). 
The notion of individual data ownership seems to be catching on. 
A handful of U.S. states have enacted legislation purporting to give 
individuals ownership over their genetic information.5 Even former  
https://www.frasercoastchronicle.com.au/news/social-media-data-
scandal-its-not-just-facebook-bu/3403026/. 
2. Blockchain in a relatively new, “tamperproof” form of technology, 
famously employed by bitcoin. Arjun Kharpal, Everything You Need to 
Know About the Blockchain, CNBC (Jun. 18, 2018), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/18/blockchain-what-is-it-and-how-does-
it-work.html. See also Megan Molteni, These DNA Startups Want to Put 
All of You on the Blockchain, WIRED (Nov. 16, 2018), 
https://www.wired.com/story/these-dna-startups-want-to-put-all-of-you-
on-the-blockchain/. 
3. See, e.g., Megan Scudellari, Get Paid for Your Genetic Data, IEEE 
SPECTRUM (Mar. 1, 2018), https://spectrum.ieee.org/the-human-
os/biomedical/diagnostics/paying-for-genetic-data-with-cryptocurrency 
(describing plans by start-up Nebula Genomics to enable consumers to 
own and sell access to their data to pharmaceutical companies using 
Blockchain technology); Ron Miller, Hu-manity Wants to Create a Health 
Data Marketplace With Help From Blockchain, TECHCRUNCH (Jul. 18, 
2018), https://techcrunch.com/2018/07/18/hu-manity-wants-to-create-
a-health-data-marketplace-with-help-from-blockchain/; Misha Angrist, 
Do You Belong to You? GENOME, Jan. 2, 2018, at 44-45 (discussing Genos, 
which claimed that customers would retain ownership of their exome data 
while receiving “transparent compensation for research studies in which 
they participate[d]”); Leonard J. Kish & Eric J. Topol, Unpatients – Why 
Patients Should Own Their Medical Data, 33 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 
921, 923 (2015) [hereinafter Kish & Topol, Unpatients] (“we have 
proposed a technological solution that allows biomedical data to be shared 
and traded as property at a very granular level”). 
4. Miller, supra note 3; see Kish & Topol, Unpatients, supra note 3, at 922. 
5. See Anya E.R. Prince, Comprehensive Protection of Genetic Information: 
One Size Privacy or Property Models May Not Fit All, 79 BROOKLYN L. 
REV. 175, 195–98 (2013) (discussing statutory enactments in Alaska, 
Colorado, Georgia, Louisiana, and Florida). But see OR. PUBLIC HEALTH 
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President Barack Obama expressed the view that “if somebody does a 
test on me or my genes . . . that’s mine.”6 
But despite its rhetorical and populist appeal, the recent trend 
toward propertization of personal health information could pose 
significant challenges to both biomedical research and public health. 
Assigning property rights to personal information could result in 
researchers incurring (or being unable to afford) sizable up-front costs 
to acquire permission to conduct most forms of data-based research and 
could limit the amount of data that public health officials can collect 
and utilize for the public benefit. Moreover, the hallmark of personal 
property -- the right to exclude -- poses an ongoing risk that individuals 
could retract or narrow their consent to data use after it has been given, 
thus compromising existing data resources and analyses. 
In their landmark Harvard Law Review article,7 Guido Calabresi 
and Doug Melamed elucidate the now-familiar dichotomy between 
property rules and liability rules. Property rules, they explain, permit 
the holder of an entitlement (a property interest) to prevent others from 
encroaching on the enjoyment of that entitlement, just as a landowner 
may prevent trespassers from entering his land.8 Liability rules, on the 
other hand, do not grant an a priori entitlement to prevent trespass, 
but do provide the aggrieved party with a legal remedy (usually 
damages) if such an encroachment occurs (i.e., allowing the land owner 
to recover monetary damages as compensation for a trespass).9 Since its 
introduction to the literature, this distinction has shed light on the 
nature of legal rules and rulemaking in contexts ranging from air 
pollution,10 to accidents,11 to intellectual property,12 to database 
 
DIV., HISTORY OF OREGON’S GENETIC PRIVACY LAW 1-3 (2007) (discussing 
1995 enactment and 2001 repeal of genetic property legislation in Oregon). 
6. Julie Hirschfeld Davis, President Weighs in on Data from Genes, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 25, 2016, at A15. But see Jorge L. Contreras, Letter to the 
Editor: The President Says Patients Should Own Their Genetic Data. 
He’s Wrong. 34 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 585, 585-586 (2016) [hereinafter 
Contreras, Letter] (criticizing this view). 
7. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, 
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 
1089 (1972). 
8. Id. at 1092. 
9. Id. at 1105–06, 1116, 1119–20. 
10. See id. at 1115-24. 
11. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS 3 (1970); STEVEN 
SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 130 (1987). 
12. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 
89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1665 (2003); Dan Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace, 
21 CARDOZO L. REV. 121, 124-28 (1999). 
Health Matrix·Volume 29·Issue 1·2019 
Liability (and) Rules for Health Information 
183 
protection,13 to criminal law.14 In prior work, Contreras extended this 
analysis to human genetic data,15 and Jane Baron has touched on its 
implications for electronic health records.16 
In this article, we argue that property rule frameworks are 
inadequate and inappropriate for the governance of human health 
data.17 Instead, we support a combination of regulatory governance 
coupled, in some circumstances, with private liability remedies. In 
support of this structure, we introduce two new case studies from health 
data repositories in the United States (the Utah Population Database) 
and Denmark (Statistics Denmark) in which regulatory approaches 
have been utilized successfully to safeguard individual privacy and data 
security while at the same time promoting the research enterprise. We 
thus recommend that these models be considered more broadly for the 
governance of human health data. 
The remainder of this article proceeds in three principal parts. Part 
I summarizes recent trends toward propertization of health data, both 
in the literature and in U.S. litigation. Part II summarizes the 
theoretical frameworks for allocating initial entitlements and controlling 
risk introduced by Calabresi and Melamed and by Steven Shavell, and 
then explores an alternative framework for health data, including an 
analysis of available remedies and the role of public authorities in 
monitoring and enforcing such rules. Part III presents two case studies 
in which regulatory frameworks have successfully been used for health 
data: the Utah Population Database and Statistics Denmark. We 
conclude with recommendations and directions for future research. 
 
13. J. H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, A Contractually Reconstructed Research 
Commons for Scientific Data in a Highly Protectionist Intellectual 
Property Environment, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 315, 387 n.372, 395, 
410 (2003). 
14. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 7, at 1124-27; Richard A. Posner, 
An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM L. REV. 1193 (1985). 
15. Jorge L. Contreras, Genetic Property, 105 GEO. L.J. 1 (2016). 
16. Jane B. Baron, Property as Control: The Case of Information, 18 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 367, 380 (2012). 
17. Individual health information includes a wide range of elements including 
medical records, test results, clinical data, tissue samples, and data 
concerning an individual’s age, health history, family history, community, 
ethnicity, and other demographic information. For an excellent discussion 
of these data types, see Barbara J. Evans, Much Ado About Data 
Ownership, 25 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 69, 90–2 (2011). The extension of data 
sharing and similar principles from the field of genomics to health 
information more generally is discussed in Jorge L. Contreras & Bartha 
M. Knoppers, The Genomic Commons, 19 ANN. REV. GENOMICS & HUMAN 
GENETICS 429, 431-32 (2018). 
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I. Property Rules and Health Data 
A. The Propertization of Health Data 
Traditionally, U.S. law has treated the use of information, once it 
is disclosed,18 as free from property entitlements. No property interest 
exists in facts or information once they are generally known.19 Rather, 
facts are part of the public domain, described by Justice Louis Brandeis 
as “free as the air to common use.”20 The unencumbered status of 
information has been recognized in cases involving not only current 
news21 and sports scores,22 but also genetic and other health data. In 
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., the Supreme 
Court held that the information contained in naturally occurring 
human DNA molecules cannot be patented.23 Likewise, in cases 
including Moore v. Regents of the University of California,24 
Washington University v. Catalona,25 and Greenberg v. Miami 
Children’s Hospital Research Institute, Inc.,26 federal and state courts 
 
18. The law of trade secrets addresses information that is both commercially 
valuable and held in confidence. Trade secrets, which are commonly 
viewed as “intellectual property,” derive their value, if not their very 
existence, from their secrecy. See Susan C. Miller, Florida’s Uniform 
Trade Secret Act, 16 FLA. ST. L. REV. 863 (1988). The focus of this paper, 
however, is on information that is disclosed or derived in a manner that 
is beyond the scope of trade secret protection. In particular, the following 
categories of information about an individual would not normally be 
considered trade secrets: information that the individual has previously 
disclosed or which is a matter of public record (e.g., address, birth date), 
information that is observable either to the naked eye or upon a medical 
examination, information that is derived from the analysis of an 
individual’s tissue or DNA. These categories of information, to the extent 
that they are legally protected are protected under laws and regulations 
pertaining to privacy, as discussed below. 
19. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344–45 (1991); 
Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 234 (1918). 
20. Int’l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 250 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
21. Id. at 234. 
22. See Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 853 (2d Cir. 
1997). 
23. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., No. 12–398, slip 
op. at 10-18 (U.S. June 13, 2013). 
24. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 493 (Cal. 1990). 
25. Washington Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667, 673 (8th Cir. 2007). 
26. Greenberg v. Miami Child. Hosp. Res. Inst., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1074 
(S.D. Fla. 2003) (Plaintiffs provided Defendants with tissue and health 
information that Plaintiffs intended for Defendants to use to research a 
specific disease. Without the Plaintiff’s knowledge, Defendants submitted 
a patent application for a genetic sequence identified. The court did not 
recognize that Plaintiffs had any legal claim to the fruits of the research). 
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have refused to recognize a personal property interest in discoveries and 
information obtained through the analysis of human biological material, 
irrespective of whether or not that material was obtained legally.27 
The trend toward data propertization has also been seen in Europe. 
Despite a general legal understanding in most European countries that 
data is not itself subject to property protection,28 the new European 
General Data Protection Regulation imposes significant protections for 
individual data including the right for individuals to exert rights of 
portability and erasure over data about themselves.29 As recently 
observed by Nadya Purtova, these features offer a regulatory framework 
that bears a strong resemblance to a property rule system.30 
Notwithstanding the general principle that unprotected data is not 
a form of property, there has recently been a resurgence of interest in 
treating individual health information under a property rule 
framework.31 Numerous scholars, policymakers, and advocates, drawing 
on earlier debates concerning property interests in personal information, 
generally,32 as well as the ownership of human tissue, body parts and 
 
27. In Moore, for example, the court found that Mr. Moore’s physician at 
UCLA committed both deception and violation of his fiduciary duty. 
Nevertheless, the court declined to recognize a property interest in Mr. 
Moore’s extracted cells and tissue or the discoveries made with them. See 
Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 793 P.2d 479, 493 (Cal. 1990). 
28. See John Rumbold & Barbara Pierscionek, Why Patients Shouldn’t 
“Own” Their Medical Records, 34 NATURE BIOTECH. 586, 586 (2016). 
29. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 27 April 2016, Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 
and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC [hereinafter GDPR]. 
30. See Nadezhda Purtova, Do Property Rights in Personal Data Make Sense 
After the Big Data Turn? 10 J. L. ECON. REG. 208, 214 (2017). 
31. See, e.g., Angrist, supra note 3, at 43; Mark A. Rothstein, Ethical Issues 
in Big Data Health Research, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 425, 427 (2015) 
(“many individuals strongly believe that their biological specimens and 
health records ‘belong to them.’”); Richard H. Thaler, Show Us the Data. 
(It’s Ours, After All), N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2011), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/24/business/24view.html; Evans, 
supra note 17, at 73 (citing media calls for patient ownership of health 
data). 
32. See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 2056, 2094 (2004) (proposing a five-part framework 
defining rights in personal information); LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND 
OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 228 (2006) (proposing a property-based 
framework to protect online privacy); Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: 
Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 
1379 (2000) [hereinafter Cohen, Examined Lives]; Jessica Litman, 
Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1289 
(2000). 
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indigenous resources,33 have argued that property rights in genetic data 
and other health information should be legally recognized. The 
rationales marshalled in favor of data propertization are varied, ranging 
from concerns over individual autonomy; privacy and dignity;34 to 
enabling individuals to sell their data and thus share in the financial 
rewards reaped by others (e.g., pharmaceutical firms);35 to offering an 
alternative (and an antidote) to the increasing control of personal data 
by large corporations;36 to considerations of group dynamics and social 
interactions;37 to enabling patients to access information about 
 
33. See, e.g., R. Alta Charo, Body of Research – Ownership and Use of 
Human Tissue, 355 N. ENG. J. MED. 1517 (2006). 
34. See, e.g., Jessica L. Roberts, Progressive Genetic Ownership, 93 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1105, 1158-59 (2018) (summarizing arguments re 
autonomy, privacy, identity); Leonard J. Kish & Eric J. Topol, 
Correspondence, 34 NATURE BIOTECH. 586, 587 (2016) [hereinafter Kish 
& Topol, Correspondence] (responding to Rumbold & Pierscionek, supra 
note 28) (“Our personal autonomy increasingly depends upon our digital 
autonomy”). 
35. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 34, at 1164 (“legally recognized genetic 
ownership rights could result in financial compensation . . . Sources of 
genetic data would enjoy some measure of wealth in the exchange”); Kish 
& Topol, Unpatients, supra note 3, at 923 (“To build a truly thriving 
health data economy, we need to harness the power of data ownership”); 
Mark A. Hall & Kevin A. Schulman, Ownership of Medical Information, 
301 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1282, 1284 (2009) (the assignment of “economic 
value to the access, control, and use of the medical information contained 
in electronic health record networks” would empower patients); David F. 
Partlett, Misuse of Genetic Information: The Common Law and 
Professionals’ Liability, 42 WASHBURN L.J. 489, 497 (2003) (“If the 
genetic information is property, it can presumably be sold, leading to a 
market in the information.”); Bartha Maria Knoppers, Population 
Genetics and Benefit Sharing, 3 COMMUNITY GENETICS 212, 213 (2000) 
(collecting statements on benefit sharing from international organizations 
including WHO, UNESCO, HUGO); Anita L. Allen, Genetic Privacy: 
Emerging Concepts and Values, in GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING 
PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA 31, 51 (Mark A. 
Rothstein ed., 1997) (allowing individuals to sell their genetic information 
could enable them to participate in the market and avoid exploitation by 
others). 
36. See, e.g., Purtova, supra note 30, at 218 (“digital giants like Google and 
Facebook harvest, hoard, hold monopoly over and exclusively profit from 
the pools of data collected through their various services, whereas these 
pools are not available to anyone else . . . . Allocating property rights in 
personal data to individuals . . . will arguably help avoid this enclosure”). 
37. See, e.g., Natalie Ram, DNA by the Entirety, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 
906–10 (2015) (proposing that DNA be owned through a “tenancy by the 
entirety” joint ownership model in order to account for the interests of 
related family members); Laura Maria Franciosi & Attilio Guarneri, The 
Protection of Genetic Identity, 1 J. CIV. L. STUD. 139, 186 (2008) 
(“[P]roperty laws may better serve as a paradigm to ensure that a greater 
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themselves that is not currently available from their healthcare 
providers.38 
These policy positions have also been advanced by litigants seeking 
to assert property interests in human genetic information and related 
biological samples. Notably, in Beleno v. Lakey, four Texas families 
sued the State of Texas for unauthorized use of blood samples routinely 
collected from newborns as part of a state program to screen for birth 
defects.39 The families brought suit when they discovered that, following 
the initial screening, the state continued to store and use these samples 
for purposes of epidemiological, environmental exposure and other 
research.40 They claimed, among other things, that the state’s failure to 
obtain their express consent to ongoing research violated their privacy 
and other rights.41 In settling the litigation, the state agreed to destroy 
its entire repository of 5.3 million infant blood samples, eliminating any 
possibility of their use in future research.42 Similar lawsuits have been 
brought in other states43 and have led, among other things, to the 
enactment of the federal Newborn Screening Saves Lives 
 
level of protection is provided for information that belongs to all of the 
individuals involved.”). 
38. Kish & Topol, Unpatients, supra note 3, at 922 (“the US legal framework 
is constructed in a manner to block individuals from accessing their own 
medical data”); Kish & Topol, Correspondence, supra note 34, at 587 
(discussing example of a patient who was unable to obtain data from the 
manufacturer of his own implanted defibrillator). 
39. See Beleno v. Lakey, 306 F.Supp.3d 930, 936 (W.D. Tex. 2009). For a 
history of newborn blood screening programs, see Sonia M. Suter, Did 
You Give the Government Your Baby’s DNA? Rethinking Consent in 
Newborn Screening, 15 MINN J.L. SCI. & TECH. 729, 734–37 (2014). 
40. Peggy Fikac, State to Destroy Newborns’ Blood Samples, HOUS. CHRON. 
(Dec. 22, 2009), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/ 
State-to-destroy-newborns-blood-samples-1599212.php; see generally 
Suter, supra note 39, at 754–57 (describing additional research uses of 
newborn blood spots). 
41. Beleno, 306 F.Supp.3d at 936. In Texas, participation in the screening 
program was required by law, with a right to opt-out for religious reasons 
only. See Suter, supra note 39, at 784. 
42. Adam Doerr, Newborn Blood Spot Litigation: 70 Days to Destroy 5+ 
Million Samples, PRIVACY REP. (Feb. 2, 2010), 
https://theprivacyreport.com/2010/02/02/newborn-blood-spot-litigation 
-70-days-to-destroy-5-million-samples/; Fikac, supra note 40. 
43. See, e.g., Bearder v. State, 806 N.W.2d 766, 776 (Minn. 2011) (deciding 
the use of newborn blood spots for research purposes without consent 
violated Minnesota law). See generally Suter, supra note 39, at 757–59 
(discussing state cases challenging infant blood spot collection and 
storage). 
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Reauthorization Act of 2014, which requires explicit parental consent 
for all research on newborn blood samples.44 
Another recent case involved the Havasupai Indian Tribe. In 1989, 
representatives of the tribe approached researchers at Arizona State 
University (ASU) to investigate high rates of diabetes among tribe 
members.45 The researchers collected approximately 200 blood samples 
from members of the tribe using an informed consent document that 
purported to authorize research concerning “the causes of 
behavioral/medical disorders.”46 By 1991, the researchers concluded 
that there was no genetic link to the high incidence of diabetes within 
the tribe.47 After the initial study, other ASU researchers continued to 
use the DNA collected from tribe members in other research projects, 
including investigations of schizophrenia and ancient human migratory 
patterns.48 When the tribe learned of this additional research it sued 
ASU for $50 million, claiming that the non-diabetes research was 
unauthorized and constituted a breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, 
negligence, and trespass to chattels.49 The parties settled the suit in 
2010, with ASU paying $700,000 to forty-one tribe members and 
agreeing to return all remaining DNA to the tribe.50 Several other 
documented cases exist in which research has been curtailed or 
discontinued after complaints were lodged by representatives of tribal 
or other local groups that contributed original biological specimens for 
research.51 
These cases demonstrate that research participants have 
increasingly asserted52 broad rights to prevent “their” data from being  
44. Newborn Screening Saves Lives Reauthorization Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 
113-240, 128 Stat. 2851 (2014); 45 C.F.R. § 46.408 (2019). 
45. Havasupai Tribe v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 204 P.3d 1063, 1066 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 2008). A summary of the background and facts of the case can 
be found in Leslie E. Wolf, Biology & Genetics: Advancing Research 
on Stored Biological Materials: Reconciling Law, Ethics, and Practice, 
11 MINN J.L. SCI. & TECH. 99, 118–125 (2010). 
46. Michelle M. Mello & Leslie E. Wolf, The Havasupai Indian Tribe Case—
Lessons for Research Involving Stored Biologic Samples, 363 NEW ENGL. 
J. MED. 204, 204 (2010). 
47. Havasupai, 204 P.3d at 1067. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 1069–71. 
50. See Jennifer Couzin-Frankel, DNA Returned to Tribe, Raising Questions 
About Consent, 328 SCIENCE 558, 558 (2010); Mello & Wolf, supra note 
46, at 204-05. 
51. See, e.g., Couzin-Frankel, supra note 50. 
52. Both the Beleno and Havasupai cases were settled by the parties prior to 
the courts’ rulings on the merits. Beleno v. Lakey, 306 F.Supp.3d 930, 936 
(W.D. Tex. 2009); Havasupai Tribe v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 204 P.3d 
1063, 1066 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008). 
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used for unauthorized purposes, even when the use of that data poses 
no meaningful physical or psychological threat to them.53 They also 
suggest that earlier precedents such as Moore54 and Greenberg,55 which 
rejected property-like ownership of individual data, are at risk of being 
eroded in the current legal climate. 
B. Informed Consent and Property Rules for Data Research 
The principal mechanism through which property-like control over 
human health data has emerged is an increasingly expansionist view of 
the doctrine of informed consent. This doctrine, which took its current 
form in response to abuses committed by researchers both during and 
after World War II, offers necessary protections to the human subjects 
of medical experimentation.56 But this otherwise essential doctrine has 
been expanded beyond its original contours to become what Contreras 
has referred to as “propertizing consent.”57 With propertizing consent, 
the permission sought from an individual to undergo a medical 
procedure, including something as simple as a cheek swab or blood 
draw, invests that individual with a property-like interest in all 
resulting data. A requirement that advance permission for the use of 
data be sought before research can commence is akin to giving an 
individual an ownership interest in all information about himself or 
herself. The reliance on individual consent for data-based research, 
which is unlikely to cause physical or psychological harm to the 
individual, enables the individual to exert a property-like right to 
exclude with respect to that data. 
The informed consent requirement and other human research 
protections are currently codified under U.S. law as part of the so-called 
“Common Rule” that applies to all federally funded research concerning 
human subjects.58 Alongside the Common Rule is the HIPAA Privacy 
Rule, which establishes detailed regulations regarding the collection, 
use, storage, and disclosure of protected health information (PHI) by 
healthcare providers, laboratories, payers, and other “covered 
entities.”59 While numerous exceptions and exemptions under the 
 
53. For a discussion of the potential threats alleged to accompany data-based 
research, see Contreras, Genetic Property, supra note 15, at 44-48. 
54. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 488-93 (Cal. 1990). 
55. Greenberg v. Miami Child. Hosp. Res. Inst., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1074 
(S.D. Fla. 2003). 
56. See NAT’L COMM’N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF 
BIOMEDICAL & BEHAV. RES., THE BELMOND REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES 
AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH 
(1979). 
57. Contreras, Genetic Property, supra note 15, at 6-7. 
58. General Requirements for Informed Consent, 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2019). 
59. 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164 (2019). 
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Common Rule and HIPAA Privacy Rule may be applied to research 
using human health data that has been de-identified (stripped of 
identifying data that can be linked back to individuals), these 
exceptions are complex, incomplete, and subject to differing 
interpretations.60 Moreover, there is increasing criticism of the informed 
consent requirement itself, given that current consent documentation, 
like computer click-through agreements, are lengthy and legalistic, 
neither giving the average consumer useful information or obtaining 
from them genuine consent.61 
The desire for property-like control over health data is not unique 
to the United States. In Europe, signs of data propertization have 
existed for some time in certain countries, particularly in the context 
of biobanking.62 However, the recently-enacted EU-wide General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR)63 has received the most attention in this 
regard.64 As in the United States, the ability to process personal data 
 
60. After all, these exceptions did little to rebut the claims in the Beleno and 
Havasupai cases. See also I. Glenn Cohen & Michelle M. Mello, HIPAA 
and Protecting Health Information in the 21st Century, 320 J. AM. MED. 
ASS’N. 231, 231 (2018) (identifying shortcomings in protections offered by 
HIPAA); Contreras, Genetic Property, supra note 15, at 33-34 (discussing 
gaps in regulatory exceptions for data-based research). See also Lisa M. 
Austin & David Lie, Safe Sharing Sites, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2019) (“[s]trategies to mitigate the risks of re-identification affect the 
accuracy of the data”). 
61. See Purtova, supra note 30, at 219; Barbara A. Koenig, Have We Asked 
Too Much of Consent? 44 HASTINGS CENT. REP. 33, 33 (2014) (“mounting 
evidence suggests the distance between the ideal of consent and its actual 
practice”); Patrick Taylor, When Consent Gets in the Way, 456 NATURE 
32, 32 (2008); Howard Brody, Transparency: Informed Consent in 
Primary Care, 19 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 5, 5 (1989) (“Physicians may also 
view informed consent as an empty charade, since they are confident in 
their abilities to manipulate consent by how they discuss or divulge 
information.”). 
62. See, e.g., Luca Marelli & Guiseppe Testa, Scrutinizing the EU General 
Data Protection Regulation: How Will New Decentralized Governance 
Impact Research? 360 SCIENCE 496, 498 (2018) (discussing the Italian 
Data Protection Authority’s decision to block the acquisition of an Italian 
health and genomic database by a UK firm and subsequent reversal of 
this decision by an Italian court); Kish & Topol, Unpatients, supra note 
3, at 924 (describing Swiss Healthbank which “empowers users to store, 
manage, share and benefit from their personal health information” and 
“has the intent to create a global data transaction platform to support 
medical research”). 
63. GDPR, supra note 29. 
64. The GDPR has shifted European privacy regulation from a centralized 
approval-based system dominated by national data protection authorities 
to a decentralized system in which responsibility for data protection is 
placed on data users and the determination of authorized users devolves 
to individual data subjects. See Marelli & Testa, supra note 62, at 496. 
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under the GDRP is based on individual consent, a concept that has, for 
many of the reasons cited in the United States, been subject to 
criticism.65 The GDPR appears to give researchers the ability to rely on 
broad, non-specific consent when “keeping with recognised ethical 
standards for scientific research,”66 though subsequent interpretive 
guidance may retreat from this position.67 As in the United States, it is 
unclear what may or may not be permitted under EU regulations 
concerning informed consent,68 potentially leading risk-averse 
institutions to follow the most conservative approach, thereby 
perpetuating and extending existing tendencies toward data 
propertization. 
C. Consequences of the Propertization of Health Data 
Numerous commentators have cautioned against the recognition of 
property-like interests in human health information on grounds both 
 
See also Purtova, supra note 30, at 211 (discussing property-like interests 
arising from GDPR right to data portability). 
65. See Marelli & Testa, supra note 62, at 496 (“the inherently open-ended 
potential of data, whose digital compatibility makes them valuable for 
research pursuits that may be wholly disjoined from the original project 
within which samples or data were gathered, thus undermining the 
classical rationale for ‘informed consent.’”); Purtova, supra note 30, at 
216. 
66. GDPR, supra note 29, at Recital 33. 
67. See generally, GUIDELINES ON CONSENT UNDER REGULATION 2016/679, 
ARTICLE 29 WORKING PARTY, available at http://ec.europa.eu/ 
newsroom/article29/item-detail.cfm?item_id=615239 (last visited Mar. 
2, 2019) (cited and discussed in Marelli & Testa, supra note 62, at 497) 
(establishing narrower guidelines in regard to giving and receiving 
consent). 
68. See Marelli & Testa, supra note 62, at 497 (noting that reconsideration 
of Italian database transfer case, discussed supra note 62, under the 
GDPR will shape future interpretation of consent requirement for data 
research). 
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moral69 and doctrinal.70 The motivating force behind this article, 
however, is the practical impact that propertization may have on the 
conduct of biomedical research and public health monitoring. This 
impact flows largely from the traditional common law attributes of 
property: principally the right of a property owner to exclude others 
from intruding on that property, as well as the rights of a property 
owner to limit use of, or even destroy, that property and to choose to 
alienate and profit from the transfer of that property.71 
Our primary concern is that the recognition of a property interest 
in individual health data could disrupt data-driven research if 
individuals have the right to withhold, recall, constrain, or destroy data 
after it enters the research pool.72 As noted above, this right was claimed 
 
69. See, e.g., Angrist, supra note 3, at 45 (quoting bioethicist Hank Greely, 
“Owning kidneys makes people think of slavery. They think it degrades 
humanity”); Baron, supra note 16, at 381-90 (property law concepts such 
as alienability and in rem treatment are difficult to translate to the realm 
of personal health data); Sonia M. Suter, Disentangling Privacy from 
Property: Toward a Deeper Understanding of Genetic Privacy, 72 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 737, 798–811 (2004) (claiming that certain things 
such as human tissue should never be alienable on dignitary grounds); 
Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 
(1987) (certain things should not be subject to market transactions). Cf. 
Marc Rodwin, The Case for Public Ownership of Patient Data, 302 J. AM. 
MED. ASS’N. 86 (2009) (arguing against corporate ownership of patient 
data on moral and practical grounds). 
70. See, e.g., I. Glenn Cohen, Is There a Duty to Share Healthcare Data?, in 
BIG DATA, HEALTH LAW, AND BIOETHICS 209, 212-14 (I. Glenn Cohen et 
al. eds., 2018) (refuting Lockean arguments for property in health data) 
[hereinafter Cohen, Duty to Share]; Barbara J. Evans, Barbarians at the 
Gate: Consumer-Driven Health Data Commons and the Transformation 
of Citizen Science, 42 AM. J. L. & MED. 651, 657 (2016) (arguing that 
many protections sought to be achieved through property law already 
exist in the regulatory frameworks that govern medical records and 
research); Barbara J. Evans, Would Patient Ownership of Health Data 
Improve Confidentiality?, 14 AM. MED. ASS’N J. ETHICS 724, 728 (2012) 
(“There are few discernible differences between the level of confidentiality 
patients would enjoy if they owned their data and biospecimens and what 
they presently have under the HIPAA Privacy Rule and the Common 
Rule.”). 
71. As famously described by Sir William Blackstone, property is “that sole 
and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the 
external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other 
individual in the universe.” SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, KNT., 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 393 (1893). 
72. See Wolf, supra note 45, at 142 (arguing that the right to withdraw 
from a research study entails the right to prevent further use of data); 
Amy L. McGuire & Laura M. Beskow, Informed Consent in Genomics 
and Genetic Research, 11 ANN. REV. GENOMICS & HUMAN GENETICS 361, 
370 (2010) (suggesting that research subjects that withdraw from studies 
be permitted to require that repositories discontinue use of personal data). 
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by the plaintiffs in the Beleno and Havasupai cases.73 Yet data-driven 
biomedical research depends on the existence of a stable and accessible 
data resource. For example, large-scale studies such as All of Us by the 
NIH plan to enroll and collect data from up to a million individuals.74 
In order to make the greatest use of this data resource, researchers from 
around the world will need to access, recombine, search, and manipulate 
this data in whatever manner is most promising.75 In the words of 
Francis Collins, Director of the National Institutes of Health, and 
Harold Varmus, Director of the National Cancer Institute, this 
flexibility is required “so that the world’s brightest scientific and clinical 
minds can contribute insights and analysis.”76 
In the world of global data sharing, the number of researchers 
requiring access to a particular data element, and the specific research 
questions that they will seek to answer, cannot be known at the time 
that data is collected or consent to research is given. Thus, there is a 
risk that consent that is too broad or non-specific could, upon later 
examination, be deemed inadequate.77 And if so, the retroactive 
withdrawal or destruction of individual data already incorporated into 
large data pools and analyses could severely compromise and/or bias 
such studies.78 
What’s more, a requirement that researchers obtain consent from 
every individual data subject prior to the commencement of research 
using data obtained from that individual (i.e., ex ante) will impose a 
substantial up-front burden on any sizable research program.79 The 
Institute of Medicine has cited several studies showing that compliance 
 
73. Supra notes 39, 45 and accompanying text. 
74. About the All of Us Research Program, NAT’L INST. HEALTH, 
https://allofus.nih.gov/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2019). 
75. See Francis S. Collins & Harold Varmus, A New Initiative on Precision 
Medicine, 372 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 793, 794-95 (2015) (“Qualified 
researchers from many organizations will, with appropriate protection of 
patient confidentiality, have access to the cohort’s data”). 
76. Id. at 795. 
77. This claim was made by the Havasupai in their litigation against ASU. 
See Havasupai Tribe v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 204 P.3d 1063, 1066 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 2008). See also Marelli & Testa, supra note 62, at 497 (discussing 
validity of broad consent under GDPR). 
78. See Contreras, Genetic Property, supra note 15, at 30 (“data and study 
results become skewed toward those individuals who are most willing to 
consent to research, whereas individuals who are less willing to consent 
are underrepresented”). See also OECD, DATA-DRIVEN INNOVATION 196-
97 (2015) (identifying practical difficulties potentially arising from 
individual data ownership). 
79. See, e.g., Rumbold & Pierscionek, supra note 28, at 586 (“Patient 
‘ownership’ of data would have the potential to make access to aggregated 
data more difficult and thus to hinder research”). 
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with extensive data privacy and consent procedures has increased both 
the difficulty of recruiting study subjects and the overall cost of 
biomedical research.80 And, given the way that healthcare markets 
work, this cost would likely be passed along to the consumer.81 
The implications of data ownership on public health monitoring 
and intervention is equally troubling. Today, primary healthcare 
providers and emergency care centers can, and in many cases are 
required to, report data regarding symptoms pointing to potential 
disease outbreaks to public health officials.82 This reporting may include 
data regarding individuals exhibiting such symptoms. Public health 
officials can use this data to track potential outbreaks, to implement 
containment strategies and to develop diagnostic tools and vaccines.83 
Obtaining individual consent to the use of data in each of these critical 
public health functions could severely impede the protection of public 
health.84 
The fragmentation of individual ownership interests in a large 
resource pool can give rise to what theorists have termed an 
“anticommons,” a situation in which progress is impeded due to the 
significant transaction costs required to assemble rights from multiple 
holders. The threat of anticommons in biomedical research was 
originally identified with the proliferation of patents covering genetic 
discoveries,85 but has recently been raised in connection with the 
broadly disaggregated ownership of individual health data.86 Such an  
80. INST. MED., BEYOND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE: ENHANCING PRIVACY, 
IMPROVING HEALTH THROUGH RESEARCH 218-20 (Sharyl J. Nass et al., 
eds., 2009). See also Cohen, Duty to Share, supra note 70, at 215-16 
(noting cost estimates). 
81. See J. Cohen, Examined Lives, supra note 32, at 1388 (“data privacy 
opponents argue that increased protection would impose unreasonable 
costs on routine consumer transactions—costs that consumers themselves 
ultimately will have to bear”). 
82. Richard N. Danila et al., Legal Authority for Infectious Disease Reporting 
in the United States: Case Study of the 2009 H1N1 Influenza Pandemic, 
105(1) AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 13, 14 (2015); see, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 26-6-6(1) (LexisNexis 2019). 
83. Ruth Ann Jajosky & Samuel L Groseclose, Evaluation of Reporting 
Timeliness of Public Health Surveillance Systems for Infectious Diseases, 
BMC PUB. HEALTH 2 (2004) (“Reasons for conducting public health 
surveillance can include the need to assess the health status of a 
population, establish public health priorities, and reduce the burden of 
disease in a population by appropriately targeting effective disease 
prevention and control activities”). 
84. See Mark Rodwin, Patient Data: Property, Privacy & the Public Interest, 
36 AM. J. L. & MED. 586, 589 (2010). 
85. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? 
The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698 (1998). 
86. See, e.g., Jorge L. Contreras, The Anticommons at 20: Concerns for 
Research Continue, 361 SCIENCE 335, 337 (2018); Contreras, Genetic 
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anticommons, if it materializes, can significantly impede efficient 
transactions and thwart socially-beneficial activity. 
For all of these reasons, individual property-like entitlements in 
health data, whether imposed through the mechanism of informed 
consent or otherwise, have the potential both to disrupt and 
substantially increase the cost of socially beneficial biomedical research. 
As the federal district court predicted in Greenberg, the recognition of 
individual property rights in health data could “cripple medical 
research.”87 
II. Liability and Regulatory Rules for Health Data 
Given the potential research challenges that could emerge as a 
result of widespread recognition of property interests in personal health 
data, it is worth considering whether there is an alternative framework 
for managing individual privacy and related interests while at the same 
time maximizing social welfare from biomedical research. As noted 
above, a useful analytical starting point for analyzing this question is 
offered by Calabresi and Melamed, who first drew the important 
distinction between property rules and liability rules in the allocation 
of entitlements between parties.88 
A. Efficiency and Ex Ante versus Ex Post Systems 
Under the Calabresi and Melamed framework, the initial allocation 
of entitlements and the choice of property versus liability rules has both 
efficiency, distributive, and justice-based consequences.89 We deal first 
 
Property, supra note 15, at 7 (anticommons in genetic information); Jane 
Yakowitz, Tragedy of the Data Commons, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 
4 (“Each individual has an incentive to remove her data from the 
commons to avoid remote risks of re-identification. This way she gets 
the best of both worlds: her data is safe, and she also receives the 
indirect benefits of helpful health and policy research performed on 
the rest of the data left in the commons. However, the collective 
benefits derived from the data commons will rapidly degenerate if data 
subjects opt out to protect themselves”). Rodwin, supra note 84, at 606 
(“private ownership of patient data would probably preclude its most 
valuable uses by fracturing population data”); Richard A. Spinello, 
Property Rights in Genetic Information, 6 ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 29, 35 
(2004) (fragmented property rights in the genetic data coming from 
multiple sources would require a substantial integration effort if that data 
were needed for a particular research project). Somewhat 
counterintuitively, Kish and Topol use the “tragedy of the commons” to 
support their argument for individual ownership of health information. 
Kish & Topol, Unpatients, supra note 3, at 923. 
87. Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 
2d 1064, 1076 (S.D. Fla. 2003). 
88. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 7, at 1090. 
89. See id. at 1093-1105. 
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with administrative efficiency.90 If, in a property rule regime, an 
entitlement is initially allocated to the occupant of land, then a traveler 
wishing to cross over than land must first obtain (and possibly pay for) 
permission to cross.91 This ex ante requirement imposes an 
administrative burden on each act of crossing over land: permission 
must be sought and the right of passage must be negotiated in 100% of 
cases. In a liability rule regime, however, the traveler may access the 
land, but may later be sued for damages by the occupier.92 
Coase tells us that, absent transaction costs, the land will either be 
crossed or not crossed, no matter where the initial entitlements are 
placed, depending on whether the occupier values her privacy more 
than the traveler values that particular route across the countryside.93 
That is, in either case an appropriate exchange of value will be 
negotiated to enable the efficient outcome to occur. But, in reality, a 
number of factors conspire to tilt the balance in one direction or 
another. Thus, in the example of the traveler, it is likely that only a 
subset of occupiers will seek ex post to recover the remedy to which 
they are entitled (i.e., if the traveler is not detected or does not damage 
the land, or if the cost of enforcing rights exceeds the occupier’s 
predicted recovery, or if the traveler is a vagabond who would lack the 
resources to satisfy any judgment against him). 
A similar logic holds when the initial entitlement is placed with the 
traveler, giving him an affirmative right to cross land occupied by 
someone else. Under a property rule regime, the traveler, knowing his 
desired route, may obtain a series of ex ante injunctive orders 
prohibiting the occupier of each tract along the route from erecting a 
fence blocking the route.94 This exercise, while guaranteed to assure the 
traveler the ability to cross the countryside unimpeded, is likely to be 
time consuming and costly. In a liability rule regime, the traveler 
proceeds across the countryside, and if he encounters a fence erected by  
90. Administrative efficiency refers to reducing the administrative costs of 
enforcement. See id. at 1093. Administrative efficiency is one component 
of the larger concept of economic efficiency, also known as Pareto-
optimality, in which allocation choices “lead to that allocation of resources 
which could not be improved in the sense that a further change would not 
so improve the condition of those who gained by it that they could 
compensate those who lost from it and still be better off than before”. Id. 
at 1094. As an analysis of Pareto-optimality is beyond the scope of this 
article, we limit our discussion of efficiency to administrative efficiency. 
91. See id. at 1091. 
92. See id. at 1092. 
93. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1, 15 
(1960) (discussed in Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 7, at 1094 n.12 and 
accompanying text). 
94. This exercise resembles the acquisition by eminent domain of “rights of 
way” by railroad and telegraph companies across large stretches of the 
American west. 
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an occupier, he may sue the occupier for damages. Assuming that 
occupiers of land understand that they will be liable for damages if they 
erect fences across a traveler’s route, then only occupiers who place a 
value on their privacy in excess of the level of damages will erect fences. 
In a property rule regime, these are the occupiers that would have 
successfully bargained with the traveler, paying him to take an 
alternate route to avoid crossing their land. 
The question which of these approaches – property or liability – is 
more efficient depends on a range of factors including the cost of fences 
and the ease of getting around them. If there are few occupiers willing 
to erect fences in the face of a damages lawsuit, then the liability regime 
will be more efficient than obtaining pre-clearance to cross each parcel 
along the desired route. But if fences are likely to pop up across every 
parcel along the route, then the traveler would be better off, and 
efficiency would be served, by obtaining an ex ante injunctive order to 
cross each parcel rather than litigating against the builder of each fence 
ex post. 
Table 1 below summarizes the options available for the allocation 
of entitlements and remedies under the Melamed and Calabresi 
framework using our stylized example of an occupier of land and a 
traveler who wishes to traverse that land.95 
 
Table 1 
Calabresi and Melamed – Entitlements under Property and Liability Rules 
B. Distributional Effects 
As observed by Calabresi and Melamed, “the placement of 
entitlements has a fundamental effect on a society’s distribution of 
wealth.”96 Distributional effects can arise both from the choice of initial 
entitlements and the choice between property and liability regimes. In 
the scenario described above, if initial entitlements are placed with land 
occupiers, then under a property rule regime, an occupier who values 
her privacy can prevent a traveler from crossing her land at no cost. If 
a traveler wishes to cross, he would have to pay her the value that she 
places on her privacy, say $5. In a liability rule regime, if a traveler 
crosses her land without permission, then she can recover that $5 in 
 
95. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 7, at 1115-16. 
96. Id. at 1098. 
Health Matrix·Volume 29·Issue 1·2019 
Liability (and) Rules for Health Information 
198 
damages from him. If, however, initial entitlements are placed with 
travelers, then in a property rule regime, the occupier would have to 
pay the traveler to refrain from crossing her land at the value he places 
on making the crossing (say $7). Likewise, if she erects a fence under a 
liability rule regime, the traveler can recover damages from her (also 
$7). Thus, depending on the initial allocation of entitlements, and 
absent transaction costs, in order to prevent the traveler from crossing 
her land, the occupier will either spend $0 or $7. The converse holds 
true for the traveler if he wishes to cross against the will of the occupier. 
The placement of initial entitlements thus has a clear distributional 
effect, even if it does not impact the ultimate use of a particular asset. 
In addition to the straightforward distributional effects arising from 
placement of entitlements, transaction costs play a large role in skewing 
the distribution of wealth. Thus, it is well-known that the cost of 
enforcing rights can be significant, and that large enterprises are more 
likely and able to enforce their rights in court than individuals. 
Likewise, the cost of monitoring compliance with legal rules can be 
significant, and larger organizations are often better placed than 
individuals to effectively monitor compliance. As a result, parties that 
are less able and willing to assert their rights will often forego remedies 
that might otherwise be available to them. 
Finally, it is important to note that, despite the stylized analysis 
common to discussions of property and liability rules, the “damages” 
available to an entitlement holder under a liability rule framework will 
not necessarily reflect actual harm or injury to the entitlement holder, 
or the value that either party places on the activity in question. Rather, 
for purposes of administrability and uniformity, the amounts levied on 
parties in liability rule regimes may be fixed by the state in a manner 
that does not take into account the particular preferences or 
circumstances of the parties at all. Speeding fines, for example, are fixed 
by the state without regard to the driver’s wealth, ability to pay, or the 
urgency of his need to get to his destination. With respect to intellectual 
property, an example can be found in the compulsory licensing scheme 
for musical compositions under the U.S. Copyright Act.97 Under this 
framework, the copyright in a composition (the entitlement) resides 
with the composer, yet any person wishing to make a recording of the 
composition after the initial recording is released (i.e., a cover or remake 
version) may do so without the copyright owner’s permission upon 
payment of a royalty fixed by the governmental Copyright Royalty 
Board.98 And in some cases, such user privileges (as in the case of fair 
 
97. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2016). 
98. 17 U.S.C. § 801(a) (2018). 
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use under the Copyright Act99) may be granted against an entitlement 
with no monetary compensation whatsoever.100 
C. Justice and Social Welfare 
Calabresi and Melamed observe that “those preferences which 
cannot be easily explained in terms of [a] few broadly accepted 
distributional preferences, or in terms of efficiency, are termed justice 
reasons.”101 Yet, Calabresi and Melamed appear uncomfortable with the 
notion of justice. They explain, in economic terms, that most social 
preferences, even seemingly non-quantitative values such as equality, 
can be grounded in distributional preferences or efficiency motivations 
or both.102 They thus cut short their discussion of justice without 
offering tangible examples of those “idiosyncratic” values that cannot 
be placed within the rubrics of either distribution or efficiency.103 
We do not share this seeming discomfort with the notion of justice. 
Clearly, in the area of human subjects research, considerations of 
individual autonomy, choice, privacy, and dignity are important. 
Likewise, where research using individual health data is concerned, 
these considerations must be taken into account, for reasons of fairness 
and justice, if nothing else. 
Though important, we do not view these considerations as pre-
empting all others. Social welfare (e.g., identifying risk factors and 
finding new cures for disease), which sounds in economic efficiency and 
distributional concerns, is also important. And, in some cases, the 
promotion of social welfare can outweigh an absolutist deference to 
individual choice. Some commentators, in fact, speak of an individual 
ethical obligation, grounded in principles of beneficence and justice, to 
help others by participating in socially beneficial research.104 As 
explained by Patrick Taylor, 
 
99. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1992). 
100. See Dan L. Burk, Critical Analysis: Property Rules, Liability Rules and 
Molecular Futures – Bargaining in the Shadow of the Cathedral, in GENE 
PATENTS AND COLLABORATIVE LICENSING MODELS 294, 301 (Geertrui van 
Overwalle, ed., 2009). 
101. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 7, at 1105. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. 
104. See Cohen, Duty to Share, supra note 70, at 216-18 (discussing arguments 
by Alan Wertheimer and others regarding a moral duty to participate in 
research); Brent Mittelstadt et al., Is There a Duty to Participate in 
Digital Epidemiology? 14 LIFE SCI., SOC’Y & POL’Y 1, 4-5 (2018) 
(summarizing justifications for a “moral duty for patients to contribute 
to biomedical research,” including arguments grounded in beneficence, 
avoidance of free riding, public goods and solidarity); David Orentlicher, 
Making Research a Requirement of Treatment – Why We Should 
Sometimes Let Doctors Pressure Patients to Participate in Research, 35 
HASTINGS CTR. REP. 20, 21 (2005) (“linking treatment to participation in 
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An enduring ethical position is that we should reciprocate in 
social arrangements through which we ourselves benefit, when the 
duties are fairly distributed across society. A good example is 
improvement to health-care quality, for which access to all 
patient outcomes is critical. Risks from participation are low, and 
benefits to all are high. We depend on participation, and share a 
duty to participate in return. We cannot simply demand the 
benefit and decline the cost.105 
We, too, believe that promoting biomedical discovery to improve 
overall human health is an important social goal that should be set 
aside only for reasons recognized as highly compromising or injurious 
to individuals. For example, if a researcher wished to publish the names 
and street addresses of participants in a mental health study so as to 
“personalize” his results for a magazine article, considerations of 
individual privacy should clearly override any marginal benefit that 
such disclosure might achieve. By the same token, if an individual who 
participated in a genetic study bore a personal animus toward members 
of a different ethnic group and wished to allow the use of her 
anonymized data for research concerning diseases affecting her own 
ethnicity, but not those primarily affecting the other ethnic group, there 
would be few legitimate reasons that such a request should be honored, 
notwithstanding the entitlement holder’s personal preference. Thus, 
while important, personal autonomy cannot override the broader needs 
of society.106 In our proposals below, we seek to promote a system that 
appropriately balances interests of personal privacy, autonomy, and 
self-determination with broader considerations of social welfare. 
D. Entitlements and the Role of the State 
As initially formulated by Calabresi and Melamed, initial 
entitlements are set by the state within a framework in which 
enforcement mechanisms are enabled by the state’s authority.107 Thus, 
the state provides a judicial system that adjudicates and enforces 
judgments awarded to private parties, but the responsibility for 
monitoring compliance with entitlement rules and bringing actions to 
enforce them rests with those private parties. Likewise, when a party 
brings an action seeking damages against another party (e.g., for 
trespass), those damages are paid to the aggrieved party and are not 
remitted to the state, even though the state’s authority enables the 
 
research could be a valuable and ethically sound way to increase patient 
participation, as long as the clinical trial involves a comparison of 
alternative, established therapies”). 
105. Taylor, supra note 61, at 32. 
106. See id. at 33 (“If we protect privacy effectively, we will not reduce ethics 
to autonomy, and autonomy to data ownership.”). 
107. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 7, at 1090-91. 
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aggrieved party to enforce its judgment against the liable party. In this 
framework, the state acts largely in the background and is not itself a 
principal actor, except as the setter of rules and allocator of initial 
entitlements. 
It is often the case, however, that the state intervenes more directly 
in the monitoring and enforcement of non-compliance with conditions 
imposed on those entitlements. As conceptualized by Henry Smith, a 
more finely-grained determination of permitted and prohibited 
activities involving an entitlement is sometimes preferable to the broad-
brushed right to exclude that traditionally accompanies property 
rights.108 This “governance” approach lends itself to governmental 
regulation rather than private enforcement of rights. For example, the 
state may grant an entitlement, such as the right to build a power 
plant, that is conditioned on the ex ante payment of a permitting fee 
to the state.109 The state may also impose ex ante licensure and approval 
requirements before some activity is undertaken (e.g., a requirement 
that a safety inspection be passed, or that drivers pass written tests 
and vision exams before being permitted to drive on public roads).110 
The state may also impose ex post fines and penalties when private 
behavior violates rules or regulations.111 For example, parking on the 
public streets of a densely-populated neighborhood can be restricted to 
those displaying a residential parking permit. When a non-resident 
illegally parks on the street, making it more difficult for residents to 
find parking, private litigation by affected residents may not be 
efficient. Instead, the city issues a ticket and fine to the offender and, 
under some circumstances, tows the offending car away. The remedies 
available to the state can be exercised both speedily and objectively, in 
a manner much more effective than private litigation by aggrieved 
residents. However, when a parking ticket is issued, the fine is paid to 
the state, not to the aggrieved residents. The benefit they receive is not 
a share of the parking fine, but the improved enjoyment of their parking 
entitlement which is made possible through the state’s enforcement 
mechanisms. 
The remedial options available to the state when it intervenes to 
protect entitlements differ structurally from the options available to 
individuals making use of the legal system in order to obtain injunctions 
or seek damages. Shavell illustrates the different remedial options 
available to individuals and to the state in the context of risk regulation 
in Table 2 below.112 
 
108. Henry E. Smith, Exclusion versus Governance: Two Strategies for 
Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEG. STUD. S453, S454-55 (2002). 
109. See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 7, at 1099. 
110. Id. 
111. SHAVELL, supra note 11, at 278. 
112. Id. 
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Table 2 
Shavell – Ex ante and Ex post remedies for risk control 
 
As explained by Shavell, in the context of different types of risk 
avoidance, there may be advantages to giving remedies, and the 
principal responsibility for policing behavior, to the state.113 For 
example, the state may be a more effective ex ante judge than 
individuals whether a particular activity (e.g., constructing a building) 
meets acceptable safety levels (e.g., building codes). It may also impose 
conditions, such as training and licensure of new drivers, on the conduct 
of risky activity. Likewise, ex post, it may be more efficient for the state 
to conduct building inspections and levy fines and corrective penalties 
against builders that do not meet code than to rely on individuals 
discovering such violations and bringing private enforcement actions. If 
society’s goal is to detect as many safety risks as possible, then relying 
on the state rather than individuals may be preferable. And from the 
standpoint of remedies, paying an ex post fine to the state, which may 
support the state’s monitoring and inspection functions, may be more 
socially valuable than permitting individuals to seek and collect windfall 
monetary damages. The state, which can be deemed to act on behalf of 
its citizens, can thus be considered as a proxy for its citizens in terms 
of collection of damages affecting society broadly. 
In addition to which party is the more efficient policer of activity 
and recipient of damages (the individual or the state), Shavell asks 
whether ex ante or ex post remedies are more likely to achieve desired 
social outcomes.114 One consideration, for example, is whether a violator 
would generally have the ability to pay ex post damages for harm that 
it caused. If, on balance, it would not (either because violators have few 
assets or because likely harms are very large - e.g., nuclear plant 
disasters), then ex ante charges and inspections prior to allowing risky 
activity might be preferred.115 
 
113. Id. at 281-82. 
114. Id. at 279. 
115. See id. at 284. 
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Shavell also addresses those situations in which state-imposed 
criminal sanctions may be desirable to address non-compliance with 
rules associated with entitlements. In general, he concludes that 
criminal penalties are advisable when monetary penalties are unlikely 
to deter undesirable behavior (e.g., when the injurer has few assets, or 
has set out to do harm).116 
E. Combining the Frameworks – Entitlements and Health Information 
When considering the optimal framework for governing research 
using personal health information, it is useful to combine the 
approaches outlined by Calabresi and Melamed, with respect to initial 
entitlements, and that of Shavell, with respect to state versus private 
remedies. To simplify matters, we make the initial and, hopefully non-
controversial, decision to place the initial entitlement with respect to 
individual health data with the individual. This placement is both 
intuitive and generally consistent with existing legal regimes that 
protect an individual’s privacy in health-related data. 
A second adjustment that we make to the Shavell framework is 
including publicly-chartered data repositories within the ambit of state 
(governmental) actors. These data repositories include biobanks and 
databases that are operated or overseen by governmental agencies, 
academic institutions, hospital networks, and non-profit research 
centers.117 We group these organizations together with more traditional 
governmental agencies even though some of them are not, strictly 
speaking, governmental bodies, due to their overall similarity and 
position with respect to health data users (researchers) and individual 
data subjects. That is, these data repositories act as the custodians of 
individual data under a relationship of trust and stewardship and 
conduct their operations in the public interest, along with other 
governmental regulatory and enforcement bodies. We thus treat them 
together. 
Third, in the area of remedies, we distinguish between penalties 
imposed on individual researchers and on the institutions that employ 
them. This differentiation allows graduation of penalties based on 
severity and prevalence within an institution. In addition, imposing 
penalties at an institutional level may create strong incentives within 
institutions to educate individual researchers regarding the relevant 
rules and restrictions concerning individual data usage, to monitor 
 
116. Id. at 284-85. 
117. For a discussion of state-operated genomic data repositories such as 
GenBank and the Database of Genotypes and Phenotypes (dbGaP), see 
Jorge L. Contreras, Leviathan in the Commons: Biomedical Data and the 
State in GOVERNING MEDICAL KNOWLEDGE COMMONS 19, 27-28 
(Katherine J. Strandburg et al., eds., 2017) [hereinafter Contreras, 
Biomedical Data]. 
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research compliance with those rules and restrictions, and to mitigate 
any violations that are discovered at an early stage. 
Given these considerations, Table 3 below illustrates the relevant 
structural options with respect to the governance of research using 
human health information. 
Table 3 
Structural Governance Options for Health Information 
(initial entitlement in data subject) 
 
1. Property Rules Enforced by Data Subjects – Consent 
With the initial entitlement assigned to an individual data subject, 
the individual’s ex ante consent is required in order to permit data-
based research. This scenario is akin to that of the traveler requiring ex 
ante permission from each land occupier to cross their land. As 
discussed elsewhere, there are serious doubts concerning the legitimacy 
and validity of individual consent in the healthcare setting, at least in 
the manner in which consent is sought and obtained today.118 And as 
discussed in Section I.C above, a property rule system requiring 
advance consent from every data subject imposes significant costs and 
delays on socially valuable research programs, particularly when they 
involve thousands or millions of individuals, and can also result in the 
compromise of data sets and analysis. For all of these reasons, we do 
not recommend this approach. 
2. Property Rules Enforced by the State – Consultation and Licensure 
In a system in which the state acts as the representative or proxy 
for individuals, the state may “consent” to the use of individual health 
data subject to certain conditions. In a property rule (ex ante) regime, 
this advance authorization may be conditioned upon the satisfaction of 
certain criteria, which might include outreach to and engagement with 
 
118. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
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relevant communities and community leaders, as well as adequate 
training and licensure of researchers. 
The engagement of researchers with patient advocacy groups has 
shown particular promise with closely knit disease-specific 
communities119 and minority or disadvantaged groups.120 We support 
inclusive outreach measures along these lines. However, we do not 
believe that these forms of patient engagement and outreach need to be 
mandated by property rules, and also suspect that advocates of 
individual consent would find such approaches, standing alone, to be 
inadequate. 
Likewise, requirements such as training and licensure of researchers 
regarding proper research usage of individual data seems to be a 
necessary but insufficient measure. Regular training of all members of 
a research team engaged in human subjects research is already required 
by the U.S. National Institutes of Health for all NIH-funded studies,121 
and should continue to be required. But, as the example of traffic 
violations illustrates, driver training and licensure alone are seldom 
sufficient to ensure compliance with applicable rules. 
3. Liability Rules Enforced by Individuals - Compensatory Damages 
In the realm of liability rules, individual entitlement holders may 
sue unauthorized infringers on their entitlements for monetary 
damages. Thus, just as a property occupier may sue an unauthorized 
trespasser for compensatory damages, an individual could sue an 
unauthorized user of her personal health data. 
Numerous existing private causes of action may already be brought 
with respect to the misuse of personal data, many of which can result 
in an award of monetary damages to the injured data subject. Damages 
in such cases may be compensatory and may also reflect a punitive or 
 
119. See, e.g., Sharon F. Terry et al., Science and Society: Advocacy Groups 
as Research Organizations: The PXE International Example, 8 NATURE 
REV. GENETICS 157 (2007) (detailing interaction between researchers and 
gene-specific disease advocacy communities); Knoppers, supra note 35, at 
213 (noting HUGO support for “prior discussion and consultation with 
communities and populations”). Cf. Lee A. Bygrave & Dag Wiese 
Schartum, Consent, Proportionality, and Collective Power, in 
REINVENTING DATA PROTECTION 157 (Serge Gutwirth, et al., eds., 2009) 
(introducing concept of collective consent). 
120. See, e.g., James V. Lavery, Building an Evidence Base for Stakeholder 
Engagement, 361 SCIENCE 554 (2018) (citing, among other examples, 
outreach to the Havasupai community). 
121. Required Educ. in the Protection of Human Res. Participants, Notice OD-
00-039, Natl. Inst. Health (June 5, 2000), https://grants.nih.gov/ 
grants/guide/notice-files/not-od-00-039.html. 
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exemplary character.122 For example, the U.S. Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) prohibits discrimination by employers 
and health insurers on the basis of an individual’s genetic information.123 
The conduct prohibited by GINA is far-reaching, as the statute bars 
even the collection of employee genetic information by an employer.124 
Employment-based actions under GINA are filed by aggrieved 
employees with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC), and then advance through an administrative process which is 
subject to appeal to the courts.125 The largest GINA verdict of which 
we are aware was an award of $2.2 million to two employees of a 
company that sought to collect DNA samples from them while 
investigating the vandalism of one of its warehouses.126 
Other causes of action may give an individual a monetary remedy 
when data about the individual is used in a manner to which he or she 
has not consented. These include common law actions for violation of 
privacy, deceit, fraud, deception, and breach of fiduciary duty (usually 
brought in the context of a healthcare provider).127 In the famous Moore  
122. In a recent article, Lauren Scholz argues that restitution is the proper 
measure of privacy damages. Lauren Henry Scholz, Privacy Remedies, 94 
IND. L. REV. 1,1 (2018). 
123. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-223, 
122 Stat. 881 (2008) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 and 
42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter GINA]. For a general discussion of GINA and an 
assessment of its first ten years in force, see Bradley A. Arehardt & Jessica 
L. Roberts, GINA, Big Data, and the Future of Employee Privacy, 128 
YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2019); Barbara J. Evans, The Genetic 
Information Nondiscrimination Act at Age 10: GINA’s Controversial 
Assertion that Data Transparency Protects Privacy and Civil Rights, 60 
WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2019); Contreras, Genetic Property, 
supra note 15, at 41-43 (discussing liability rule framework under GINA). 
Protections such as those offered by GINA are not unique to the United 
States. Aime Keis, Biobanking in Estonia, J.L. MED. & ETHICS 20, 22 
(2016) (Estonian law “prohibits discrimination and stigmatization of gene 
donors” and “[p]roviding any [genetic] information to insurance companies 
or employers”). 
124. GINA, Sec. 202(b). 
125. See GINA 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (2015). 
126. Lowe v. Atlas Logistics Grp. Retail Serv. (Atlanta), LLC, 102 F. Supp. 
3d 1360, 1361 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (the vandalism included the placement of 
human feces in one of the company’s warehouses, which the company 
sought to identify by matching it to the DNA of its employees). 
127. For a more detailed discussion of these causes of action, see Contreras, 
Genetic Property, supra note 15, at 51-53. Jack Balkin has introduced the 
idea of an information fiduciary, “a person or business who, because of 
their relationship with another, has taken on special duties with respect 
to the information they obtain in the course of the relationship.” Jack M. 
Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 1183, 1209 (2016). This concept appears well-suited to frame 
private actions and liability for health data breaches. 
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case, even though Mr. Moore’s property law conversion claim failed, he 
succeeded in his tort and fiduciary claims against UCLA and its 
physicians.128 
We support the use of ex post liability rules such as these to govern 
the use of individual health data. However, we feel that liability rules 
based on individual enforcement are insufficient. As noted above, 
individuals often lack the expertise, resources, and information 
necessary to monitor and police behavior of data users.129 Moreover, 
U.S. tort law does not offer particularly generous remedies for purely 
dignitary harms,130 and, as noted by Litman in questioning the 
effectiveness of tort law for regulating data privacy, “common law 
lawmaking is ordinarily both gradual and slow.”131 Accordingly, we 
would reserve individual-based actions to those that are likely to have 
a significant and particularized impact on the individual’s personal or 
financial condition. For more diffuse and generalized harms, we 
recommend actions initiated by public authorities, as described below.132 
4. Rules Enforced by Public Authorities – Institutional and 
Professional Penalties 
As summarized in Table 3, in addition to injured individuals, data 
repositories and governmental agencies (public authorities) may bring 
actions to enforce data usage rules. The policing of data usage by public 
authorities in the area of healthcare is far from new. Federal rules 
governing the appropriate usage of individual health data exist in both 
the so-called “Common Rule” that applies to all federally funded 
research on human subjects133 and the HIPAA Privacy Rule.134 Given 
the superior information that public authorities would likely have about 
 
128. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 493 (Cal. 1990); see 
also Litman, supra note 32, at 1308 (discussing tort and fiduciary remedies 
for privacy violations). 
129. For a more detailed discussion of monitoring and enforcement costs in the 
context of genetic data regulation, see Contreras, Genetic Property, supra 
note 15, at 48-49. 
130. See, e.g., William L. Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: 
A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REV. 874, 877 (1939) (“If the plaintiff is to 
recovery every time that her feelings are hurt, we should all be in court 
twice a week.”); Russell Fraker, Reformulating Outrage: A Critical 
Analysis of the Problematic Tort of IIED, 61 VAND. L. REV. 983, 1000-
1001 (2008). 
131. Litman, supra note 32, at 1313. 
132. Litman also appears, though somewhat unenthusiastically, to support a 
combined tort and regulatory approach. Litman, supra note 32, at 1313 
(“If what data privacy really needs is federal statutory protection, tort 
litigation is actually a plausible route to enactment”). 
133. General Requirements for Informed Consent, 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2017). 
134. 45 C.F.R. § 160 (2003); 45 C.F.R. § 164 (2003). 
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data usage practices, as well as superior resources for monitoring 
compliance with data usage rules, public authorities are likely to be in 
a better position than affected individuals to ensure broad rule 
compliance and achievement of data protection and privacy goals. We 
thus recommend ex post public authority enforcement as a preferred 
method for regulating research using individual health information. 
a. Monetary Fines and Penalties 
As part of their enforcement function, public authorities may seek 
to impose monetary fines and penalties on violators of these rules. Such 
penalties are sometimes imposed today in particularly egregious cases 
of research misconduct.135 The authority to impose such fines and 
penalties is inherent to governmental agencies but could also be 
authorized by contracts between data repositories and data users. The 
imposition of fines and penalties in the context of research misconduct 
has historically been rare. The possibility of such penalties, however, 
has become more prominent in Europe following implementation of the 
GDPR, which imposes substantial monetary fines for misuse of personal 
data,136 and in the United States following Duke University’s recent 
agreement to pay $112.5 million in settlement of a range of research 
misconduct claims.137 
b. Remediation 
In addition to monetary remedies, many cases of research 
misconduct involve remedies designed to reverse the harmful effects of 
a particular violation. Such remedies include heightened oversight,138 
retraction of published papers,139 disgorgement of grant awards,140 and, 
 
135. See, e.g., Greg Langlois, Pitt Prof to Pay $132K for Science Research 
False Grant Claims, BNA LIFE SCI. L. & INDUS. RPT., Mar. 23, 2018 
(“University of Pittsburgh professor required to pay penalty of $132.027 
for allegedly falsifying data in NSF grant applications”). 
136. See, e.g., Marelli & Testa, supra note 62, at 496 (fines of up to 20 million 
Euros or 4% of a company’s annual global revenue). 
137. See Sheila Kaplan, Duke University to Pay $112.5 Million to Settle Claims 
of Research Misconduct, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/25/science/duke-settlement-
research.html. 
138. See, e.g., Alison McCook, Duke’s Mishandling of Misconduct Prompts 
New U.S. Government Grant Oversight, SCIENCE, Mar. 23, 2018, 
https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2018/03/duke-s-mishandling-
misconduct-prompts-new-us-government-grant-oversight (U.S. NIH 
imposes stringent oversight requirements on Duke University in the wake 
of misconduct allegations). 
139. See, e.g., RETRACTION WATCH, https://retractionwatch.com (last visited 
May 17, 2018) (cataloging retraction of scientific papers). 
140. Disgorgement is a rare and severe remedy. See Leonid Schneider, What if 
Universities Had to Agree to Refund Grants Whenever There was a 
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in relation to the proposal made in this paper, the deletion of ill-gotten 
or misused data. 
Remedies such as these are typically designed to be obtained by 
governmental agencies, though in the case of health information, data 
repositories might also be in a position to seek such remedies when 
authorized under applicable contractual arrangements. In the case of 
remediation remedies, it is important that individual data subjects not 
have the right to seek the destruction or return of data pertaining to 
themselves. Conceding such a right would push health information back 
toward a property rule regime and the welfare reducing outcomes seen 
in cases such as Beleno and Havasupai. Thus, the right to require 
deletion or destruction of health data should be used sparingly, and 
only against a particular data misuser, rather than the entire research 
community. 
c. Debarment 
Though imposed only occasionally, one of the most punitive 
remedies available in research misconduct cases is the debarment of 
individual researchers or, on rare occasions, institutions, from certain 
benefits or privileges. Typically, debarment prohibits a researcher from 
participating in government-funded research, or seeking further 
research funding, for one to three years.141 Because of the significant 
impact that debarment can have on an individual’s career, this remedy 
is sought and imposed only a handful of times per year by the major 
scientific funding agencies in the United States.142 Debarment of 
research institutions from seeking federal grant support is largely 
unheard of, given the catastrophic effect that such a measure would 
likely have on most research institutions. However, debarment of 
contractors (including large firms) from seeking and obtaining 
government contracts is not uncommon in cases of fraud, 
embezzlement, unfair trade practices, failure to perform, and other 
inappropriate conduct.143 Debarment remedies could also be extended 
to biomedical research institutions. 
 
Retraction?, RETRACTIONWATCH (Jan. 19, 2015), 
https://retractionwatch.com/2015/01/19/universities-agree-refund-
grants-whenever-retraction/. 
141. See, e.g., Jeannie Baumann, New York University Professor Slapped with 
Research Debarment, BNA LIFE SCI. L. & INDUS. RPT., Mar. 21, 2018 
(reporting on a former NYU professor debarred from government-funded 
research for three years after allegedly falsifying images in published 
papers); Findings of Research Misconduct, NATL. INST. HEALTH (Apr. 19, 
2018), https://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-files/NOT-OD-18-
169.html (recounting the story of a UNC researcher debarred from 
federally-funded research for two years after finding of data falsification). 
142. See Jeffrey Mervis, After the Fall, 354 SCIENCE 408, 409 (2016). 
143. See Frequently Asked Questions: Suspension and Debarment, U.S. GEN. 
SERVICES ADMIN., https://www.gsa.gov/about-us/organization/office-of-
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In the case of data misuse, debarment remedies could include 
blocking the access of individual researchers or institutions to some or 
all data. Unlike several other remedies discussed above, debarment in 
the case of data misuse would likely be sought by the data repository 
(rather than an aggrieved individual or government agency) given the 
repository’s custodial role over such data. 
d. Other Penalties 
In addition to the penalties described above, research institutions 
may impose professional sanctions on individual researchers that violate 
rules regarding data access and use. These sanctions may range from 
minor (e.g., warnings) to severe (e.g., demotion or dismissal). While 
only the institution itself has the authority to impose these sanctions, 
either a governmental agency or a data repository may require an 
institution to discipline its individual researchers as part of the 
conditions permitting institutional access to a data resource. 
Finally, it is always the case that violation of data privacy or 
security rules may result in civil or criminal penalties beyond what may 
be stipulated in a set of data access rules. Enforcement of these legal 
penalties is the sole province of government and should generally be 
reserved for violations of the most serious nature. 
5. A Proposed Rule Framework for Health Information 
To summarize the above, we propose that research using individual 
health data should be subject to a regulatory regime, enforceable by 
government/public repositories, while at the same time permitting 
limited private enforcement actions to address particularized individual 
injury. Thus, while the physical collection of human tissue would 
continue to be subject to existing rules regarding informed consent,144 
ex ante consent would not be required for the use of information derived 
from physical samples. Rather, rules regarding proper research use of 
health information would be put in place, and violations of those rules 
 
governmentwide-policy/office-of-acquisition-policy/gsa-acq-policy-
integrity-workforce/suspension-debarment-division/suspension-
debarment/frequently-asked-questions-suspension-debarment#Q4 (last 
reviewed Feb. 26, 2019). 
144. For example, physical DNA samples could be collected during any routine 
medical procedure to which the subject consented, or via a special 
procedure (e.g., saliva swab, blood draw) for which any physical risks were 
adequately disclosed and to which the subject has consented. Likewise, 
DNA collected through non-invasive means, such as the collection of crime 
scene evidence, would not trigger any consent requirement. See, e.g., 
Rebecca Robins, The Golden State Killer Case Was Cracked with 
Genealogy Website. What Does That Mean for Genetic Privacy? STAT 
(Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.statnews.com/2018/04/26/genealogy-
golden-state-killer-privacy/ (describing the apprehension of a notorious 
serial killer by combining DNA evidence with public databases, all 
without the consent of the suspect). 
Health Matrix·Volume 29·Issue 1·2019 
Liability (and) Rules for Health Information 
211 
could be dealt with on an ex post basis. The precise conduct that these 
rules would cover remains open to debate, and should be discussed 
broadly by researchers, research funders, and patient groups. A range 
of commentators have proposed that data usage and privacy rules be 
enhanced to prevent misuse of personal data, re-identification of data 
subjects, insufficient data security measures, and other misuses.145 
Existing examples of data usage and protection rules are described in 
the case studies in Part III below. 
Whatever rules are put in place, researchers who violate those rules 
would be subject to penalties that could include monetary damages and 
fines, debarment, and remedial measures. However, data would not 
have to be destroyed or removed from existing data sets, and 
permissible research using that data could continue unabated. Thus, 
while deterrents would exist to dissuade individual and institutional 
researchers from engaging in abusive practices, socially beneficial 
research by innocent researchers could continue unimpeded. And 
because ex ante consent from every research participant would not be 
required, the efficiency of the research enterprise would be improved.146 
 
145. See, e.g. Contreras, Genetic Property, supra note 15, at 44-48 (proposing 
liability rules to enhance existing GINA protections, prohibit 
reidentification of data subjects, restrict commercial uses of data and 
enhance data security); Taylor, supra note 61, at 33 (“Governments 
should broaden privacy protections to extend across all organizations 
and agencies that hold sensitive information, including web service 
providers, pharmaceutical companies, corporate data-miners, 
providers of personal health records, universities and government. 
Reidentifiability must be addressed and prevented in cases in which 
extensive linkage between health and genetic information is 
maintained.”); Cohen & Mello, supra note 60, at 232 (proposing 
“expanding the penalties and civil remedies available for data breaches 
and misuse, including reidentification attempts” and “a general rule 
protecting health data that specifies further, custodian-specific rights”). 
146. Overall cost savings would emerge if the cost of monitoring and enforcing 
noncompliance with research rules (see Contreras, Letter, supra note 6, at 
48-50 (discussing monitoring and enforcement costs)) were lower than the 
cost of seeking and obtaining consent from all research participants. As 
such, it is likely that overall costs will be lower under a liability rule 
system in scenarios with large numbers of individual participants (ex ante 
consent cost) and a low incidence of noncompliance with rules (ex post 
enforcement cost). It is a separate question how these overall costs are 
allocated. Without state intervention, it can be assumed that ex ante 
consent costs will be borne by researchers and ex post monitoring and 
enforcement costs will be borne by individual research subjects. The state 
can adjust initial entitlements and burdens to reflect social priorities. For 
example, in the case studies described in Section II.B. below, the state 
itself has assumed the burden of compliance monitoring and enforcement 
(see supra note 187 and accompanying text). 
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III. Rules for Health Data Research - Two Case 
Studies 
In this section we present two case studies – one from the United 
States and one from Denmark – in which governmental rules have been 
used successfully to govern large-scale repositories of health data. These 
repositories each operate under a statutory mandate independent of 
general rules governing human subjects research and informed consent. 
These case studies demonstrate that a regulatory framework, in lieu of 
a property rule framework, may be both practical and useful in 
governing research using human health data. 
A. Utah Population Database (UPDB) 
The Utah Population Database (UPDB) comprises a large set of 
linked health, genealogical and demographic records pertaining to 
residents of the U.S. state of Utah, their relatives, and their ancestors 
around the world.147 The resource, which extends back to the late 
eighteenth century (seventeen generations), contains more than thirty-
one million records with data from nearly ten million individuals.148 The 
UPDB is unique in that it links records from three distinct types of 
sources: state and federal vital statistics records (birth, death, marriage, 
divorce, drivers’ license, Social Security, and voting registration 
records), nearly two million multigenerational genealogical records from 
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (the Mormon church),149 
and more than 500,000 state cancer registry records (which, in recent 
years, have included an increasing number of biospecimens).150 The 
 
147. See generally Ken R. Smith et al., The Utah Population Database: A 
Model for Linking Medical Genealogical Records for Population Health 
(forthcoming); Lisa A. Cannon Albright, Utah Family-Based Analysis: 
Past, Present and Future, 65 HUMAN HEREDITY 209, 210 (2008); Mark H. 
Skolnick, The Utah Genealogical Database: A Resource for 
Genetic Epidemiology, in BANBURY REPORT NO. 4: CANCER INCIDENCE IN 
DEFINED POPULATIONS 285, 285, 287 (John Cairns et al., eds., 1980). 
148. See Smith et al., supra note 147, at 5; Utah Population Database, 
HUNTSMAN CANCER INST., https://healthcare.utah.edu/ 
huntsmancancerinstitute/research/updb/data/ (last updated June 8, 
2018) [hereinafter UPDB Data]. 
149. The Mormon faith places a high value on ancestral and genealogical 
information. As such, the Mormon church maintains what it claims to be 
“the largest collection of family records in the world”, containing 
information on an estimated 3 billion living and deceased individuals from 
more than 100 countries. Genealogy, CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF 
LATTER-DAY SAINTS, https://www.mormonnewsroom.org/topic/ 
genealogy (last accessed Mar. 08, 2019). 
150. See UPDB Data, supra note 148. Cancer registry data includes 
approximately 350,000 records from the Utah Cancer Registry and 
200,000 records from the Idaho Cancer Registry. Cancer is a reportable 
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compilation and linkage of these data sets enable a range of 
epidemiological and genetic studies. For example, the linkage of 
multigenerational family genealogies with death records and cancer 
registry data has enabled the identification of familial patterns of cancer 
susceptibility across a wide range of tumor types, which can then 
facilitate recruitment to further studies.151 
The state of Utah, like all U.S. states, provides for the collection of 
health data for statistical and public health purposes. This power is 
currently delegated to the Utah Department of Health, which has the 
authority to collect and maintain a broad range of health data.152 
Personally identifiable health data collected by the Department may 
not be disclosed except with the consent of the data subject153 or under 
a number of statutory exceptions. One of these exceptions permits the 
disclosure of health data “for bona fide research and statistical 
purposes” as determined by the Department, provided that the 
recipient of the information enters into a written agreement to protect 
the data in accordance with legal requirements and not to permit its 
further disclosure.154 The use of individual health data for research 
purposes is further protected under a statutory liability shield, which 
permits any person, without incurring liability, to provide data relating 
to the “condition and treatment” of an individual, as well as familial 
and other related information, to “scientific and health care research 
organizations affiliated with institutions of higher education” for the 
purpose of “study and advancing medical research” among other 
things.155 
The linkage of Utah vital statistics records with Mormon 
genealogical records began in the early 1970s through a collaboration 
between the University of Utah and the Mormon church.156 In 1982, 
Governor Scott Matheson issued an Executive Order creating the Utah 
Resource for Genetic and Epidemiologic Research (RGE) as a “data 
resource for the collection, storage, study, and dissemination of medical 
and related information” to be used “for the purpose of reducing 
morbidity or mortality, or for the purpose of evaluating and improving 
 
condition in many states including Utah. UTAH ADMIN. CODE r.384-
100-1 (2017). 
151. See Smith et al, supra note 147, at 3, 15; Cannon Albright, supra note 
147, at 210-218. 
152. UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-3-2 (LexisNexis 2017) (enacted 1981). 
153. UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-3-7(1) (LexisNexis 2017) (enacted 1981). 
154. UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-3-7(3) (LexisNexis 2017) (enacted 1981). See 
also UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-3-10 (LexisNexis 2017) (enacted 1981) 
(pertaining to Department measures required to protect identifiable 
health data). 
155. UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-25-1(1)-(3) (LexisNexis 2017) (enacted 1981). 
156. Smith et al., supra note 147, at 4. 
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the quality of hospital and medical care.”157 The RGE was originally 
administered by the Utah Department of Health, but in 1986 this 
authority was transferred to the University of Utah,158 which continues 
to oversee the UPDB today. 
UPDB does not engage in primary data collection. Rather, it links 
data from a range of public sector and private data sources, provides 
front-end search and analytical capabilities, and makes these resources 
available to approved researchers (discussed below). Because most data 
linked by UPDB was not collected for research purposes, but for official 
governmental or church recordkeeping, the consent of individual data 
subjects has not been sought or obtained either by UPDB or the original 
data collector (e.g., church or state agencies).159 Given this 
acknowledged omission, RGE is charged with safeguarding the privacy 
and security of individual data that is accessible through the UPDB.160 
In order to access and use data through the UPDB, researchers 
(who may be employed by non-profit or for-profit organizations) must 
apply to the RGE indicating the purpose and scope of a proposed 
research project.161 Each application is reviewed by the RGE Review 
Committee, which consists of university faculty and RGE staff, as well 
as representatives from each of the suppliers of data to the UPDB (e.g., 
Utah Cancer Registry, Mormon church, Utah Department of Health, 
etc.).162 The Review Committee reviews the application as a whole, 
giving particular attention to its data privacy and security plan.163 In 
addition, any data contributor may “veto” the use of its data in any 
given project if they feel that the use is not appropriate.164 Each user 
authorized to access UPDB data is required to sign a confidentiality 
agreement to protect individual-level data.165 
 
157. Utah Exec. Order (Jul. 14, 1982). 
158. Utah Exec. Order (Feb. 20, 1986). 
159. See supra note 163-164 and accompanying text; see also Smith et al., 
supra note 147, at 12. 
160. See Smith et al., supra note 147, at 9; Utah Resource for Genetic & 
Epidemiologic Research (RGE)-Policies and Procedures, U. UTAH, 
https://rge.utah.edu/policy_updb.php, (last visited Jan. 2, 2019) 
[hereinafter RGE Policies]. 
161. RGE Policies, supra note 160, Guidelines for Use of RGE-Held Data, Sec. 
I. 
162. RGE Policies, supra note 160, Organization and Operation of the 
Resource; Smith et al., supra note 147, at 9; Utah Resource for Genetic 
& Epidemiological Research (RGE)-RGE Review Committee, U. 
UTAH https://rge.utah.edu/review_committee.php (last visited Jan. 
2, 2019). 
163. RGE Policies, supra note 160. 
164. Smith et al., supra note 147, at 9. 
165. Id. 
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Penalties for non-compliance with required confidentiality and 
other usage restrictions are set forth in the RGE Policies as follows: 
The RGE Director, using discretionary authority, may 
immediately suspend an authorization based upon behavior 
contrary to the best interests of the RGE or the data. The 
suspension will be in effect pending an investigation by the RGE 
Review Committee. Violations of any RGE rules, especially 
regarding data confidentiality, will subject the individual to the 
appropriate disciplinary response including suspension of user 
privileges, notification of the Institutional Review Board and the 
Office of the Associate Vice President for Research Integrity and 
Compliance, and, as appropriate faculty discipline (see Code of 
Faculty Responsibility) and investigation of possible violation of 
state law (see Utah Code Section 26-25-5).166 
Thus, ensuring compliance with data usage requirements is 
incumbent on the RGE, acting as an agent of the state government on 
behalf of individual data subjects. Data subjects have no direct 
entitlement to prevent usage of data pertaining to themselves or to seek 
damages for misuse of such data. Penalties for non-compliance consist 
primarily of state-imposed debarment from further usage of the resource 
(“suspension of user privileges”), as well as internal administrative 
disciplinary procedures (e.g., for University of Utah faculty members), 
and potential state prosecution.167 We are unaware of any instance in 
which such penalties have been sought or imposed. 
By most measures the UPDB has been a success. The quantity and 
types of data that it links have steadily increased over the years of its 
operation. More importantly, use of UPDB data has led to hundreds of 
peer reviewed scientific publications, indicating that the availability of 
this resource has helped to advance scientific understanding.168 With 
the increasing linkage of stored biospecimens with existing UPDB 
genealogical and statistical data, it is hoped that this resource will 
continue to be a valuable resource for the research community. 
B. Statistics Denmark (DST) 
Statistics Denmark (DST), a division of the Danish Ministry for 
Economic and Interior Affairs, has been a central authority for national 
 
166. RGE Policies, supra note 160, Guidelines for Use of RGE-Held Data. 
Under the referenced statutory section (Utah Code 26-25-5), “[a]ny use, 
release or publication, negligent or otherwise, contrary to the provisions 
of [Chapter 26-25] is a class B misdemeanor.” 
167. Id. 
168. See Utah Population Database – Publications, UNIV. UTAH, 
https://healthcare.utah.edu/huntsmancancerinstitute/research/updb
/public ations/2016.php (last visited Jan. 2, 2019); Cannon Albright, 
supra note 147, at 210-214. 
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Danish statistics for more than 150 years and still produces official 
statistics relating to the Danish population, economy, culture, and 
environment.169 This data, which includes a range of vital statistics 
(birth, death, marriage, divorce, etc.), is presented in a searchable, 
aggregated form on the DST web site170 and is compiled in various 
agency reports. It is made available to the public at no charge and may 
be used for any purpose, so long as the data source is properly 
acknowledged.171 
All Danish citizens are assigned a unique ten-digit civil registration 
(CPR) number.172 The CPR number itself is associated with 
demographic information,173 and also facilitates the combination of this 
data with other governmental registries covering health, education, 
employment, and income information on an individual level. Further, 
health data from both public and private encounters are routinely 
transferred to national registries using an individual’s CPR number.174 
DST offers remote access to de-identified individual level data through 
CPR175 for researchers at institutions authorized by DST.176 Under 
Danish law, consent must in general be obtained for health-related 
research projects.177 Research based solely on registry records, however, 
does not require individual consent and researchers can thus conduct 
purely registry-based research projects on the Danish population using 
the CPR number without the consent of the participant.178 
 
169. STATISTICS DENMARK, https://www.dst.dk/en (last visited Mar. 8, 2019). 
170. For example, users may compile data graphs and tables correlating annual 
data for variables such as age, fertility rate, cause of death, marital status, 
household income and immigration status. See, e.g., Population and 
Elections, STATISTICS DEN., https://www.dst.dk/en/Statistik/emner/ 
befolkning-og-valg (last visited Jan. 17, 2018). 
171. General Terms—Open Data and Copyright, STATISTICS DENMARK, 
https://www.dst.dk/en/OmDS/omweb (last visited Jan. 17, 2019). 
172. Carsten Bøcker Pedersen, The Danish Civil Registration System, 39 
SCANDINAVIAN J. PUB. HEALTH 22, 22-23 (2011). 
173. Id. 
174. Id. 
175. Under the Danish Act on Processing of Personal Data, Act No. 429 of 
May 31, 2000, research results based on personal data may only be made 
available on an anonymized basis. Mette Hartlev, Genomic Databases and 
Biobanks in Denmark, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 743, 749-751 (2015). 
176. Lau Caspar Thygesen et al., Introduction to Danish (Nationwide) 
Registers on Health and Social Issues: Structure, Access, Legislation, and 
Archiving, 39 SCANDINAVIAN J. PUB. HEALTH 12, 14 (2011); Data for 
Research, STATISTICS DEN., https://www.dst.dk/en/TilSalg/ 
Forskningsservice (last visited Jan. 17, 2019). 
177. See Hartlev, supra note 175, at 745. 
178. Folketinget. Bekendtgørelse af lov om videnskabsetisk behandling af 
sundhedsvidenskabelige forskningsprojekter. [The Danish Parliament: 
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In order to access and use individual level data from DST, 
researchers must sign a written researcher agreement that contains a 
number of conditions and restrictions on data use.179 For example, 
researchers must agree to download only aggregated results (data, 
tables, figures) from DST’s servers, and not to download individual-
level data (“micro data”) pertaining to individuals, households, families, 
or business entities, even if this data is accessible on the server.180 DST 
offers as a rule of thumb that data transferred to a researcher’s 
computer “should be aggregated to a level which can be used directly 
in a publication.”181 
DST also lays out a detailed set of penalties for violation of these 
policies. Thus, if DST observes that individual-level data have been 
transferred to a researcher’s computer, it will immediately block all 
access to DST data by the researcher and its institution.182 The 
researcher and its institution are then required to delete all files 
containing the improperly downloaded data, and the institution must 
prepare both an explanation of the violation and a remedial plan to 
avoid such violations in the future.183 While DST is evaluating the 
matter, access to all DST data is closed to both the researcher and the 
institution.184 If such violations recur, DST may limit or close access to 
the researcher and the institution for a longer period based on the 
severity of the violation and the number of prior incidents.185 Figure 1 
below illustrates the hierarchy of severity and recurrence-based 
penalties for such data violations. 
 
 
  
Ministerial Order on Scientific Treatment of Health Scientific Research 
Projects]. (Denmark 2017 [hereinafter Danish Ministerial Order]. See also 
Hartlev, supra note 175, at 746. It is the authors’ understanding, based 
on Nordfalk’s communications with DST, that the enactment of the 
GDPR will not require significant changes to DST’s data access and usage 
policies. However, DST plans to implement a number of ministerial 
changes as a result of the GDPR. For example, DST’s standard data usage 
agreement will no longer require that researchers report on their research 
to the Danish Data Protection Agency, as researchers will be directly 
responsible for their use and handling of data. 
179. GUIDELINES FOR TRANSFERRING AGGREGATED RESULTS FROM STATISTICS 
DENMARK’S RESEARCH SERVICES, STATISTICS DEN. (2015) [hereinafter 
DST Guidelines]. 
180. Id. 
181. Id. 
182. Id. at 5. 
183. Id. 
184. Id. at 5-6. 
185. Id. at 6-7. 
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Figure 1 
Statistics Denmark Advisory Summary of Sanctions in Cases of a breach of 
the data confidentiality rules or data security186 
  
 As summarized in Figure 1, for an inadvertent mistake that has 
only occurred once, the researcher and institution may be barred from 
access to DST data for one month, while a deliberate attempt to derive 
personal identities from DST data will result in the permanent exclusion 
of the researcher. If the violation occurs three times within the same 
institution, the institution is barred from using all DST data.187 
 
186. Id. at 7. 
187. Id. at 7. 
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The framework that DST has implemented to deal with the use of 
its data relies on regulatory rules. While individual data subjects have 
no property-like entitlement to control the use of data once it has 
entered the DST database or to exclude researchers from using that 
data, DST itself imposes meaningful penalties on researchers and 
institutions that violate the cardinal rule of data access: no downloading 
of individual-level data. These penalties escalate based on the severity 
of the violation and the degree of recurrence. 
The penalties that DST imposes are of the remediation and 
debarment varieties. Monetary penalties are not a part of the DST 
framework at this time. DST’s remediation remedy requires the deletion 
of individual-level data that was improperly downloaded to a 
researcher’s computer. This remedy is reasonable and appropriate given 
the outright prohibition on downloading this data. Moreover, this 
remedy should have little effect on legitimate use of the data, either by 
the affected institution or by others, as no bar is imposed on the 
continuing use of properly downloaded aggregate data. Thus, unlike a 
property rule system in which aggrieved data subjects could potentially 
disrupt compliant research use of data pertaining to themselves, the 
liability rule imposed by DST is narrowly focused on the offending data 
and parties. 
Likewise, the debarment remedies available to DST are calculated 
to penalize, first, the noncompliant researcher and, in more serious or 
recurring cases, its institution. The escalating nature of these penalties 
is fitting as it assigns differing time periods for debarment based on 
severity and recidivism. Even “permanent” debarment for an individual 
or an institution, while harsher than most U.S. governmental 
debarment penalties, can be seen as justified given the high premium 
placed by DST on the privacy interests of its data subjects. 
C. Lessons Learned from UPDB and DST 
Both UPDB and DST make large quantities of individual health 
data available to researchers without obtaining specific consent from 
individual data subjects. Instead, the public custodians of the data 
assume the responsibility for ensuring that data users observe rules and 
restrictions regarding access to and use of the data. UPDB and DST 
have been able to proceed in this manner because they are maintained 
by governmental agencies operating, to differing degrees, outside of the 
general regulatory scheme for human subjects research. UPDB, as an 
arm of the Utah State Government that does not receive U.S. federal 
funding, does not operate under the strictures of the Common Rule, 
and DST operates under Danish national legislation that does not 
require consent for register-based research.188 
However, as governmental agencies, UPDB and DST are 
themselves invested with a public interest role and can, as such, be  
188. Danish Ministerial Order, supra note 178. 
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relied upon to safeguard the privacy and other interests of individuals 
whose data they maintain and make available. As a result, the need to 
obtain ex ante consent from every data subject is avoided with 
concomitant efficiency gains and cost savings. In turn, monitoring and 
enforcement are required, but this burden has been assumed by the 
state rather than individual data subjects.189 
Another important feature of both of these frameworks is that 
private remedies, such as those asserted in Beleno and Havasupai, are 
excluded. As noted above, Utah law expressly shields those who provide 
“condition and treatment” data to researchers from civil liability, 
instead limiting remedies for data misuse to those specified under the 
RCE statute.190 In Denmark (and under the GDPR) private remedies 
are also unavailable.191 Thus, in both of these regimes, the extreme 
remedies sought in cases such as Beleno (destruction of 5.3 million 
infant blood spots) and Havasupai ($50 million in damages) are not 
available. Table 4 below summarizes the remedy types authorized under 
the UPDB and DST frameworks: 
 
Table 4 
Remedies Authorized by UPDB and DST 
 
Type of Remedy UPDB DST 
Compensatory damages No No 
Fines and penalties No No192 
Remediation Yes Yes 
Debarment Yes Yes 
Institutional Sanction Yes No 
Criminal Sanction Yes No 
 
 
 As noted above, the data access and usage frameworks established 
by the UPDB and DST are regulatory, rather than property or liability 
rules. Individual data subjects have no right to pre-approve uses of their 
validly-collected data, nor do they have a remedy in the event of 
unauthorized access or usage. Rather, the government, acting in the 
public interest, fulfills both of these roles: it determines, using a defined 
administrative process, who may access and use data, and on what 
terms they may do so. It also enforces compliance with its data access 
 
189. Cf. Contreras, Biomedical Data, supra note 117, at 36-38 (discussing role 
of state in enforcing rules relating to public data access). 
190. See supra note 150 and accompanying text. 
191. See GDPR, supra note 29, at Article 83. 
192. Significant fines may be imposed under the GDPR. See GDPR supra note 
29. 
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and usage rules and levies penalties for non-compliance. These 
penalties, when warranted, may be harsh (e.g., permanent debarment 
of an institution from data access in the case of DST), but in all cases 
they are directed solely against the offending individuals and 
institutions, not more broadly against innocent researchers who have 
obtained and used the relevant data in accordance with applicable rules. 
As such, the likelihood that large-scale socially valuable research will 
be disrupted by the assertion of individual rights in data is substantially 
reduced. 
This is not to say, of course, that establishing regulatory and 
liability rule regimes for the governance of data-based research will be 
easy or cost-free. Fashioning such a framework requires careful 
attention to potential threats to personal privacy that may arise from 
contemplated research, as well as prioritization of violations and 
formulation of remedies. In the U.S., general liability rules already exist 
to prohibit abuses of genetic data by employers and insurers under 
GINA, to protect patients from unauthorized use of data by physicians, 
and to redress injuries caused by violation of privacy laws.193 Data 
custodians such as UPDB have additional protections for the data that 
they make available, including strict requirements regarding data 
confidentiality. DST imposes serious penalties for downloading 
individual-level data from its servers. Data custodians in other 
jurisdictions may establish different priorities and penalties.194 Yet the 
diversity that may emerge across systems should not be viewed 
negatively. Differences in policy design indicate a system that is 
working to tailor requirements to the needs of its stakeholders. It is the 
“one size fits all” property rule framework that creates results that are 
often inappropriate and mismatched to the needs of individual systems. 
Once a framework for data access and usage is in place, monitoring 
of compliance and enforcement against violators is required.195 Though 
default allocation rules would typically place this monitoring and 
compliance burden on individual data subjects, in the UPDB and DST 
cases the state has shifted these burdens to a public authority.196 This 
allocation is likely efficient, as individual data subjects are in a 
comparatively weak position to detect noncompliance with data access 
 
193. See Contreras, Genetic Property, supra note 15, at 41-43 (discussing 
liability rules). 
194. See, e.g., David Cyranoski, China Cracks Down on Genetics Breaches, 
563 NATURE 301, 301 (2018) (describing Chinese Ministry of Science 
enforcement actions against institutions violating genetic data sharing 
rules). 
195. For a more detailed discussion of monitoring and enforcement costs in the 
context of genetic data regulation, see Contreras, Genetic Property, supra 
note, 15, at 48-51. 
196. Hartlev, supra note 175, at 747; UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-3-10 (LexisNexis 
2017). 
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and usage rules 197 This shift also satisfies general notions of fairness 
and equity as the government is charged with safeguarding individual 
interests and privacy.198 Of course, allocating these burdens to the data 
custodian (whether a state agency, a university or other research 
institution) increases the cost borne by these institutions. But, if the 
advancement of biomedical research is a priority for the state, then it 
is not unreasonable to expect the state to allocate sufficient resources 
to cover these monitoring and enforcement costs.199 
IV. Conclusions 
The recent trend toward the propertization of human genetic and 
other health data under U.S. law poses significant challenges to large-
scale biomedical research and public health. Property rule systems can 
result in sizable up-front costs in the ex ante acquisition of informed 
consent from individual data subjects, as well as the ongoing risk that 
data subjects will retract consent or object to unanticipated data uses, 
thus compromising existing data resources and analyses. 
We argue that liability rule and regulatory frameworks, in which 
data-based research is permitted but researchers are subject to penalties 
for impermissible data access or usage, can offer robust protection of 
individual data privacy and security while better promoting the 
integrity of the research enterprise and reducing inefficiencies associated 
with the acquisition of consent from large numbers of data subjects. We 
propose that research using individual health data should be subject to 
a regulatory regime, enforceable by government/public repositories, 
while at the same time permitting limited private enforcement actions 
to address particularized individual injury. Thus, though the physical 
collection of human tissue would continue to be subject to existing rules 
regarding informed consent, ex ante consent would not be required for 
the use of information derived from physical samples. Rather, rules 
regarding proper research use of health information would be put in 
place, and violations of those rules could be dealt with on an ex post 
basis, both through regulatory penalties and private actions.  
197. It is not always the case that individual data subjects will remain unaware 
of alleged rule violations, as the private actions brought in the Beleno and 
Havasupai cases demonstrate. Beleno v. Lakey, 306 F.Supp.3d 930, 936-7 
(2009); Havasupai Tribe v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 204 P.3d 1063, 1066 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2008). 
198. Thus, while shifting the monitoring and enforcement burden to a private 
firm might not seem equitable, even if it were efficient, shifting the burden 
from individuals to a public authority that acts on behalf of its citizens, 
does not raise the same equity issues. 
199. For examples of state-led initiatives in making biomedical data broadly 
available and the multifaceted role of the state in such initiatives, see 
Contreras, supra note 116, at 39. 
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Our recommendations are supported by two cases studies: the Utah 
Population Database and Statistics Denmark, both of which provide 
examples of successful health data repositories that are governed by 
regulatory systems. While both of these examples are drawn from 
governmental data resources, the approach that they exemplify, and 
their limitations on private causes of action, can be extended to 
academic and other research environments. We thus recommend that 
such regulatory models be considered more broadly for the governance 
of research using human health data. 
